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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for failure to respond to 
an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6.13.5 (1995), and license plate and 
registration card violation, a class C misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(5) (1993), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable William A. Thome, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AMD 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the court properly determine that the prosecutor's 
peremptory strikes against two jurors was not racially motivated? 
Since this issue presents a question of fact, based on the 
credibility of the party making the strike, the trial court's 
decision "will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous." 
State v. Merrill. 928 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah App. 1996) (citing 
Case No. 960372-CA 
Priority No. 2 
State v. Hiqqjnbotham. 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996)). 
2. Was the trial court correct in refusing to give an 
instruction limiting the jury's consideration of evidence for 
impeachment value only when the same evidence was admitted to 
prove defendant's guilt in the State's case-in-chief without 
objection? Whether a curative instruction is required in a 
particular case is matter of trial court discretion. State v. 
Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990). 
3. Did defendant invite error by initiating an improper 
attack on the prosecutor's reference to defendant's failure to 
call a witness to testify? This is uniquely a question of 
appellate court discretion. As a threshold question, this Court 
must decide whether defendant preserved his claim that the 
prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof by referring to 
defendant's failure to call the witness. An objection to the 
evidence must be specific, clear and on the record, otherwise the 
issue will not be considered on appeal. State v. Larsen. 828 
P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
2 
Utah Rules of Evidence# Rule 105 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or 
for one purpose but not admissible as to another party 
or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon 
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper 
scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Scott Bowman, was charged with failure to respond 
to an officer's signal to stop (Count I) and license plate and 
registration card violation (Count II) (R. 7-9). Following a 
jury trial, defendant was convicted on both counts (R. 67-68). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of zero-
to-five years and three months on counts I and II, respectively, 
but suspended sentence and placed defendant on probation for 
twenty-four months (R. 94-96). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Tfre Crimta*! Case 
At about 11:45 p.m. on August 5, 1995, Salt Lake County 
Deputy Sheriff Ann Cardon was headed north on 20th East at the 
intersection of 3300 South (R. 140). As the light turned green 
in her direction, she saw a man on a motorcycle, headed east on 
3300 South, accelerate through the intersection (R. 141, 163) . 
At the same time, the rider turned towards Deputy Cardon, showing 
a shocked and surprised expression on his face (R. 141). Deputy 
Cardon's headlights and the street lights on all corners were on 
(R. 142). From a distance of about 20 feet, Deputy Cardon saw 
3 
that the rider was a Caucasian man with dark hair of average 
length and a moustache, wearing a tank top and shorts, riding a 
brown motorcycle without license plates (R. 143, 156, 164-66). 
The rider then sped up rapidly, turning south on 23rd East 
(R. 142-45). Deputy Cardon turned on her overhead lights and 
sirens (R. 144). Almost catching up with the fleeing rider, she 
saw him turn onto a small street on the north side of a 
restaurant (R. 145). Knowing the area quite well and expecting 
that the rider would come around the other side of the 
restaurant, Deputy Cardon positioned her patrol car to block the 
end of the street on the south side of the building (R. 146). As 
expected, the rider came directly at her and, although almost 
tipping the motorcycle over, managed to maneuver the motorcycle 
past the patrol car, apparently hitting it with his foot as he 
drove by (R. 146-49). Deputy Cardon got another good view of the 
rider for about five to ten seconds at this point (R. 147-48, 
169) . 
The rider then proceeded on the west sidewalk of 23rd East 
until he reached 33rd South, where he entered the street and 
continued west (R. 150-51). In pursuit at seventy miles per 
hour, Deputy Cardon nonetheless failed to catch up with and lost 
sight of the rider, whom she estimated was traveling at more than 
ninety miles per hour (R. 151). Deputy Cardon broadcast a 
description of the rider as a dark-haired Caucasian male wearing 
4 
a tank top and short pants, riding a brown motorcycle (R. 192). 
While cruising the area, Deputy Cardon was approached by 
Kevin Mitchell in a parking lot (R. 152) . Mitchell said that he 
witnessed the chase, knew the rider, "Scotty" Bowman, and could 
provide the names and addresses of the defendant and his parents 
(R. 152, 172). On that information, Deputy Cardon and other 
officers went to defendant's parents' house, but did not find 
defendant (R. 153-54). 
About thirty to forty minutes after first encountering 
defendant, and after definitely ruling out another suspect found 
near 33rd South and 6th East, Deputy Cardon rejoined the other 
officers at the other address given to her by Mitchell (R. 154-
55, 157, 186). This address was above the restaurant on the same 
small street in which defendant had earlier tried to elude Deputy 
Cardon (R. 154, 184). Before Deputy Cardon arrived, Deputy Lenny 
Bruno had already located a brown motorcycle, the engine of which 
was too hot to touch, and interviewed defendant, who matched the 
description and was wearing the same style of clothes as that 
broadcast by Deputy Carcjon (R. 192-94). When Deputy Cardon 
arrived, she immediately and unhesitatingly recognized defendant 
as the rider she had been pursuing and the motorcycle was the one 
she had earlier seen defendant riding (R. 156-57, 177, 185). The 
motorcycle was missing license plates and registration sticker 
(R. 156, 198). 
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Defendant, admittedly intoxicated and having difficulty in 
balancing himself, first told Deputy Bruno that he had been home 
all night (R. 178-79, 19G, 199, 206, 219). Shortly afterward, 
defendant said that he had driven his car instead of his 
motorcycle (R. 197). Deputy Bruno felt the car's engine and 
found it "extremely cold" (R. 197). Defendant also told Deputy 
Bruno that no one had ridden his motorcycle that night. 
Following his arrest, defendant talked randomly and 
incessantly during transport to the jail, alternately denying 
that he had done anything and then expressing regret that he had 
caused problems (R. 158, 241-45). 
Defendant testified and acknowledged owning the two-tone 
brown motorcycle seized, which was neither licensed nor 
registered (R. 216-18) . Although he denied having ridden the 
motorcycle that night, he admitted that no one else had the keys 
to the motorcycle, that he did not know why the motorcycle engine 
might be hot, and that he wore a tank top and shorts and had a 
moustache, as Deputy Cardon had observed (R. 219-20, 225-26) . 
Defendant also suggested that Mitchell, a former roommate, 
fabricated his eyewitness identification because he was angry at 
defendant for having kicked him out of their apartment (R. 221). 
Jury Selection 
Prospective jurors completed background questionnaires, 
which were distributed to counsel (R. 114, 341). First the trial 
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court questioned the prospective jurors, after which both the 
prosecutor and defense counsel also briefly questioned them with 
regard to their questionnaire answers (R. 341-47). In response 
to the prosecutor's question about whether they would be unable 
to act fairly in spite of family or friends having been charged 
with a criminal offense, no juror responded (R. 341). 
After certain prospective jurors were removed for cause, 
counsel each exercised their three peremptory challenges.1 
Pertinent to defendant's claim, the prosecutor used his first and 
second peremptory strikes to remove Ms. Frances Alires (juror 
number 16) and Ms. My Dang (juror number 9) (R. 69). Defense 
counsel used his third peremptory strike to remove Mr. Sudhir 
Nadkarni, a man of apparent Indian descent (R. 69, 369). 
After the jury was sworn (R. 366),2 defense counsel raised a 
Batson challenge against the prosecutor's strikes of Ms. Alires 
and Ms. Dang (R. 367). Counsel stated that Ms. Dang was 
1
 Due to the limited size of the prospective panel, counsel 
agreed to exercise only three of four allowed peremptory 
challenges (R. 359, 365). 
2
 Court's have generally dismissed Batson claims made after 
the jury was sworn and venirepersons excused from the courtroom. 
See McCrory v. Henderson. 82 F.3d 1243, 1247 (2d Cir. 1996); 
United States v, Maseratti, i F.3d 330, 335 (5th cir. 1993). 
However, because the trial court considered defendant's Batson 
claim even though presented after the stricken jurors had been 
excused and the panel sworn, the challenge appears to have been 
adequately preserved. £££ State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 
(Utah 1991) (holding that because trial judge took evidence on 
and ruled upon a challenge to hearsay evidence at trial--even 
though the objection was not timely raised--the issue was 
preserved for appeal). 
7 
obviously of Asian descent and Ms. Alires was a woman of Hispanic 
descent and that there was nothing negative on the questionnaires 
of either woman, attached at Addendum A (R. 367). Because the 
prosecutor had not individually questioned these two prospective 
jurors, defense counsel claimed he had established a prima facie 
case of discrimination (R. 368). 
The prosecutor responded that he did not strike Ms. Dang 
based on race, but rather because he was concerned about her 
command of English (R. 368). He struck Ms. Alires because he had 
another defendant in a pending case whose relatives had 
improperly received a lot of optical goods, and he feared there 
might be a connection between Ms. Alires and that defendant (R. 
368). The prosecutor specifically noted that he did not even 
know whether she belonged to a minority (R. 368). Defense 
counsel pointed out Ms. Alires' questionnaire indicated that none 
of her family had ever been charged with an offense, and that the 
prosecutor had not struck others on the panel who had similarly 
answered (R. 114, 368-69). 
The trial court denied the challenge: 
I think the case law makes fairly clear that the 
challenge at least has to pose race-neutral basis. It 
does not--if I remember part of the works of the Court, 
it doesn't have to be a good reason, it simply has to 
be a neutral reason. 
I will note for the record as well there is a 
person of obvious Indian descent who did remain and was 
not stricken [by the prosecutor]. 
(R. 369). After defense counsel informed the court that he had 
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stricken Mr. Nadkarni because of his ties to law enforcement, the 
prosecutor again asserted his belief that he did not recognize 
"Alires" as a minority name (R. 370). He further stated that it 
was an unusual name, one that he had not encountered in his 
fifteen years of practice and one which he remembered for that 
reason (R. 370). 
Request for Limiting Instruction 
During the State's case-in-chief, Deputy Cardon testified 
that, on the way to jail, defendant explained that he had led 
officers on a chase apparently because he was upset about his 
wife, who lived in Toronto, not allowing him see his children (R. 
158). When defendant later took the stand, he denied being the 
person Deputy Cardon had chased and denied that he told officers 
he fled because he was upset with his wife (R. 222, 224, 227). 
The State then recalled Deputies Cardon and Bruno to rebut 
defendant's testimony (R. 234-44). 
The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection that 
the above-referenced evidence had already been introduced in the 
State's case-in-chief, noting that the State was entitled to use 
rebuttal evidence to contradict defendant's preceding testimony 
(R. 235). The deput ies' rebuttal (R. 234-44) went to the same 
statements of defendant that they reported in their direct 
examinations in the State's case-in-chief (R. 158# 209-10). 
Specifically, Deputy Bruno testified that defendant claimed his 
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wife, who lived in Toronto, Canada, would not let him see his 
children, that he was "acting out a life," and that he was a wild 
man (R. 235) . Deputy Cardon reported substantially the same 
statements, including that defendant referred to himself as a 
"king" and that defendant had suggested that the deputies cite 
him and then release him and allow him to pay a fine (R. 241-44) . 
Defense counsel initially argued that because defendant's 
statements appeared to have been given without Miranda warnings3 
he was entitled to a curative instruction (R. 249) . The 
prosecutor answered that the deputies' testimony was proper 
rebuttal for impeachment and that Miranda was not applicable 
because defendant's admissions were not in response to 
interrogation (R. 250). The trial court, without ruling on 
whether Miranda rights had been given, indicated that defendant's 
rambling admissions to Cardon might have been the result of 
Deputy Bruno's prior questioning (R. 250). After the prosecutor 
again argued that defendant's admissions were admissible 
impeachment evidence, defendant asked for an instruction limiting 
the jury's consideration of his post-arrest statements for 
impeachment purposes only (R. 250-51). The trial court refused 
3
 £££ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 463, 86 S. Ct. 1602 
(1966). The record is unclear as to whether defendant's Miranda 
rights were violated. Deputy Bruno did not read defendant his 
rights, but Officer Langley, present at the scene, might have (R. 
239). Deputy Cardon's report does not indicate that she read 
defendant his rights (R. 242). 
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to give such an instruction, stating that (1) a limiting 
instruction would only draw the jury's attention to the issue, 
when the case really centered on Deputy Cardon's identification 
of defendant and it was thus not critical that such an 
instruction be given, and (2) the evidence was "admissible as it 
was presented" (R. 252).4 
Cfaqiengg to Prosecutor'g Re^ttal Cgpci^ nt 
During closing argument, defense counsel argued that the 
jury should acquit defendant because the State had failed to call 
as a witness Kevin Mitchell, who first informed Deputy Cardon 
that defendant was the fleeing motorcyclist (R. 150, 272-73) . 
Defendant argued that because Deputy Cardon was then "predisposed 
to identify defendant as the suspect, and because Mitchell's 
accosting Deputy Cardon was "odd," and there appeared to be "bad 
blood" between Mitchell and defendant, the State's failure to 
call Mitchell to testify amounted to the withholding of critical 
facts sufficient in itself to raise a reasonable doubt as to 
defendant's guilt (R. 272-74), 
In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated: 
And so if Mr. Bowman -- or if [defense counsel] thinks 
[Mitchell's] such an important witness, although he has 
4
 Since defendant's request for a limiting instruction was 
brought up in the context of the deputies' rebuttal testimony, 
and the prosecutor argued that the deputies' testimony was 
presented at that point for impeachment, it would appear that the 
trial court found their testimony admissible "as it was presented 
[for rebuttal]" (R. 252). 
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no responsibility to produce any evidence, he has every 
opportunity to bring him in and let you hear from him. 
So, if he wanted you to hear from him, he has that 
opportunity--
(R. 281) . At this point, defense counsel interrupted, saying: 
Objection to that, Judge. Of course, [Mitchell's] 
listed as a prosecution witness on the police reports, 
and if I'd known he wasn't going to be here, I would have 
done that, but --
(R. 281). The trial court, clarifying that the prosecutor had 
simply remarked that if defense counsel had wished Mitchell to 
testify, counsel could have brought the witness in, overruled 
defendant's objection (R. 281). The prosecutor went on to state: 
So, if--if that's such a big deal to [defense counsel], 
he has every opportunity to bring in everybody he wants, 
he has the subpoena power of the Court and so he wants 
you to think, boy, that's a big flaw in the State's case. 
(R. 281-82). 
SUMMARY QF ARSVMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant, having conceded on appeal that the prosecutor's 
reasons for using peremptory strikes to remove Ms. Alires and Ms. 
Dang from the jury panel were facially neutral, also fails to 
show that the trial court's findings that the prosecutor did not 
act with discriminatory intent were clearly erroneous. The 
prosecutor struck Ms. Dang because he was concerned about her 
command of English. The videotape of voir dire displays Ms. 
Dang's timorous and inaudible responses, spoken in the manner of 
people uncomfortable with a foreign language, a view confirmed by 
her uncomprehending answers to the jury questionnaire. The 
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prosecutor struck Ms. Alires because he feared that she might be 
related to another defendant having the same surname in a pending 
case. The prosecutor did not recognize either the juror or her 
name to be Hispanic, a condition never established on the record. 
Any motivation to discriminate was undercut by the fact that 
defendant and Ms. Alires were of different races. 
POINT II 
Defendant cites no controlling authority requiring a trial 
court to give a limiting instruction in the circumstances of this 
case. First, the court never expressly ruled that defendant's 
statements had been taken in violation of Miranda, and so a 
limiting instruction distinguishing substantive from impeachment 
use was never warranted. Even if the deputies' rebuttal was 
offered only for impeachment, the court properly recognized that 
to instruct the jury from considering it substantively would only 
confuse it, since precisely the same evidence had been admitted 
during the State's case-in-chief without objection. In any case, 
because the clear purpose of the deputies' testimony was for 
impeachment only, and because there was substantial independent 
evidence of guilt, any error was harmless. 
POINT III 
Because defendant failed to adequately specify that his 
objection to the prosecutor's comment in closing argument 
concerned an alleged improper burden shifting, defendant failed 
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to preserve his claim. Considering the merits of defendant's 
claim, Utah case law has upheld substantially the same comments 
made by the prosecutor in this case. Defendant also invited any 
error in closing argument by initiating an attack to which the 
prosecutor merely responded in kind. Any error was harmless 
because defendant had himself already opened the door to the 
prosecutor's response, the trial court repeatedly instructed the 
jury on the State's burden of proof, and evidence of guilt was 
substantial. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S USE 
OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES AGAINST TWO JURORS WAS NOT RACED 
BASED WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
A. Introduction 
Under Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny, parties may not 
discriminate against potential jurors by exercising peremptory 
challenges solely on the basis of race or gender. Batson. 476 
U.S. 79, 90, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723 (1986); see also J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B.. 511 U.S. 127, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994). 
At trial, defendant demanded that the prosecutor give a race-
neutral reason, pursuant to Batson. for peremptorily striking 
potential jurors Alires and Dang (R. 367-68). In response, the 
prosecutor explained that he did not recognize Alires or her name 
as Hispanic, but thought she might be related to another 
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defendant in a pending case. He struck Dang because he was 
concerned about her command of the English language (R. 368). 
The trial court accepted the prosecutor's explanation as genuine 
and race-neutral and, accordingly, denied defendant's Batson 
challenge (R. 369). On appeal, defendant disputes the trial 
court's ruling, claiming that the trial court should not have 
accepted the prosecutor's reason because it was clearly a pretext 
for purposeful discrimination. Appellant's Br. at 10-11. 
The United States Supreme Court has established how a trial 
court should approach a Batson challenge: 
[0]nee the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made 
out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step 
1), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of 
the strike to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation (step 2). If a race-neutral explanation is 
tendered, the trial court must then decide (step 3) 
whether the opponent of the strike has proved 
purposeful racial discrimination. 
State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996)(emphasis 
added) (citing Purkett v. Elem. 514 U.S. 765, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 
1771 (1995) (per curiam) . 
Because the prosecutor gave his reasons for striking the 
jurors (though he also challenged defendant's claim of Alires' 
ethnicity) and because the trial court ruled on the ultimate 
issue of discriminatory intent without first considering whether 
defendant had carried his initial burden, the issue of whether 
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defendant established a prima facie case has been waived.5 
In like fashion and in recognition of the low standard now 
clearly promulgated by the Supreme Court, defendant appears to 
concede that the prosecutor's reasons for striking the 
prospective jurors were facially valid, thus satisfying the 
strike proponent's burden at the second step of the Batson 
analysis.6 Appellant's Br. at 21-23. 
5
 See e.g., Merrill. 928 P.2d at 403 ("Where the proponent 
of the peremptory challenge fails to contest the sufficiency of 
the prima facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal 
explanation for the challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie 
case was established is waived.") (quoting Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 
at 547). 
6
 The proponent of the challenged strike in a Batson case 
faces only a modest threshold in coming forward with a race-
neutral reason for his strike (step 2): 
The second step of this process does not demand an 
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. uAt 
this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the 
facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. 
Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the 
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed race neutral." 
filem, H 5 S. Ct. at 1171 (quoting Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 
352, 360, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991) (plurality opinion); id. 
at 374, 111 S. Ct. at 1874 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
The prosecutor struck Ms. Alires because he suspected that 
she might be related to another defendant whose case was pending. 
He struck Ms. Dang because he doubted her command of the English 
language. Those reasons are plainly facially valid and race-
neutral, and therefore, adequate to satisfy the State's burden at 
the second step of the analysis. 
1€ 
B. p f^gngi^ At Failed t9 Sfa<?w that the ggQgegyitQr'g 
Peremptory Strikes were Motivated by PigcrimiaatQry 
Iptefrt* 
1# The Standard of Review 
The third step in the Batson analysis requires the court to 
decide whether the Batson claimant has proved purposeful racial 
discrimination.7 Hiaainbotham. 917 P.2d at 548; see also Elem, 
115 S. Ct. at 1771 (uthe ultimate burden of persuasion regarding 
racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent 
of the strike"). "As this is a question of fact, turning on the 
credibility of the party making the strike, the trial court's 
decision 'will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.'" 
Merrill. 928 P.2d at 403 (quoting Hiaainbotham. 917 P.2d at 548). 
In Hernandez, the Court explained the peculiar fact sensitivity 
of a Batson challenge: 
In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the 
decisive question will be whether counsel's 
race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge 
should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence 
bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will 
be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the 
challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, 
7
 In Elem. the Court further explained Batson/s admonition 
that "to rebut a prima facie case, the proponent of the strike 
'must give a "clear and reasonably specific" explanation of his 
"legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges,' and that the 
reason must be 'related to the particular case to be tried.'" 
Elem, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. Utah appellate court's have adopted 
the same standards for evaluating the strike proponent's race-
neutral reasons, to wit: (1) neutral, (2) related to the case 
being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) 
legitimate. £&£ Merrill. 928 P.2d at 403 (citing State v. Cantu. 
778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II"). Because defendant 
challenges only the legitimacy of the prosecutor's reasons, this 
Court need not consider any other basis. 
17 
evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on 
demeanor and credibility lies '"peculiarly within a 
trial judge's province.11' 
Hernandez. 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S. Ct. at 1869 (citations 
omitted). Because of this unusual fact sensitivity, the trial 
court's findings are entitled to great deference, see id.. and 
the appellate court will accept the trial court's conclusion 
'"unless it is so lacking in support in the evidence that to give 
it effect would work that fundamental unfairness which is at war 
with due process.'" Id. at 368, 111 S. Ct. at 1871 (citations 
omitted); £££ also State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987) 
(the clearly erroneous standard requires great deference to the 
trial court's findings).8 
Further, "[t]o show clear error, the appellant must marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding and 
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack." Hiaainbotham. 917 P.2d at 548 
(citations omitted). 
In this case the trial court stated simply and without 
8
 Defendant mistakenly argues that Utah appellate courts 
have taken a "more refined" approach in applying the deferential 
standard, instead considering the issue as a mixed question of 
fact and law where the prosecutor's reasons are uniquely factual. 
Appellant's Br. at 24. In support he cites only on Cantu II. 
However, in that case the court specifically stated that it was 
applying the clearly erroneous standard. Cantu. 778 P.2d at 518. 
That the court reversed only means that it found the trial 
court's findings inadequate under the clearly erroneous standard. 
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elaboration that the prosecutor's reason for striking the jurors 
was race-neutral (R. 369). While the court did not explicitly 
state, for example, that it found the prosecutor's reasons 
supported by the record or that the prosecutor appeared credible 
to the court, the record supports those implicit findings,9 and 
defendant has failed to show they were clearly erroneous as to 
each prospective juror removed by the prosecutor's peremptory 
strikes. 
2. My Dang 
The prosecutor struck Ms. Dang because he had doubts about 
her command of the English language and did not wish to embarrass 
her by further questioning her (R. 368; Videotape 11:13:25-48 
A.M.). Although defendant claims to have marshaled all the 
evidence in support of the prosecutor's reasons, he has neglected 
critical bases for the prosecutor's assessment of this juror. 
First, Ms. Dang's questionnaire, attached at Addendum A, 
indicates a serious lack of comprehension of the language (R. 
114). In answer to the "education years completed," Ms. Dang 
first wrote, "No," and then apparently changed her response to 
"1993," also an inappropriate answer. Similarly, in response to 
"marital status," she first wrote an answer that, though 
9
 Sfifi State V. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 
1991) (the appellate court "upholds the trial court even if it 
failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be 
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings"). 
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difficult to discern, does not appear responsive, i.e., it is not 
"married," or "single," or "divorced." Ms. Dang then overwrote 
her response with the word "female," also an inappropriate 
response. Finally, in the space left for "number of children," 
Ms. Dang wrote "0," but then wrote "20," in the space provided 
for children's ages (R. 114). 
It is evident that Ms. Dang's questionnaire was a sufficient 
basis for the prosecutor's suspicions about her language ability. 
These suspicions were confirmed by her responses to the trial 
court's initial voir dire. The record indicates that Ms. Dang's 
responses were inaudible (R. 330). Defendant suggests that this 
merely indicates that Ms. Dang was soft-spoken. Appellant's Br. 
at 30. However, the videotape of the proceedings plainly 
indicates that Ms. Dang was an unusually "soft-spoken" person and 
that when defense counsel asked her to speak up, she did not 
audibly change her voice (Videotape 10:19:25-59 A.M.). From this 
refusal to answer audibly, even when specifically requested to do 
so, the prosecutor could quite reasonably have inferred that Ms. 
Dang felt uncomfortable in publicly expressing herself in 
English, in the manner of people who feel inadequate speaking a 
foreign language. Indeed, the prosecutor's feeling that Ms. Dang 
would feel embarrassed by being singled out for voir dire on her 
language skills, and his decision not to further question her, 
shows genuine sensitivity for Ms. Dang's feelings, rather than a 
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wish to discriminate against her. Ms. Dang's timorous responses 
alone constitute an adequate basis for the prosecutor's striking 
her and the court's finding that the prosecutor's reason was not 
racially motivated. £££ Hiacrinbotham. 917 P.2d at 548 (body 
language alone is a sufficient basis to support the exercise of a 
peremptory challenge); State v. Macial. 854 P.2d 543, 547 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993) (peremptory 
challenge upheld where juror was unwilling to respond without 
apparent reason). In this case, the prosecutor's reasons were 
based not only on the juror's demonstrated reluctance to express 
herself in the English language, but also on her demonstrated 
inability to understand it. Although the trial court did not 
make explicit findings on these points, the court plainly 
recognized the validity of the prosecutor's assessment in finding 
his reasons for striking Ms. Dang race-neutral, and this Court 
should similarly find that the trial court's conclusion is not 
clearly erroneous. 
3. Frances Alires 
Defendant principally challenges the prosecutor's reasons 
for striking Ms. Alires because her questionnaire provides no 
grounds and, contrary to the prosecutor's stated suspicion, does 
not indicate that she or any of her family members had been 
charged with an offense, an assertion the prosecutor evidently 
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doubted but did explore with further questioning.10 Further, 
defendant argues that since the prosecutor did not strike other 
potential jurors who similarly answered the family background 
question and because the prosecutor would likely recognize an 
Hispanic name, the prosecutor's reasons must be pretextual. 
Appellant's Br. at 20-23, 26-29.1X 
10
 In support, defendant cites from Cantu II. several 
additional factors "that may cast doubt upon the legitimacy of a 
purportedly race-neutral explanation." Cantu. 778 P.2d at 518. 
These include: 
(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the 
juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or 
perfunctory examination, assuming neither the trial 
court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror, 
(3) singling the juror out for special questioning 
designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the 
prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the 
case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally 
applicable to juror [sic] who were not challenged. 
IJL. at 518-19 (quoting State v. Slappy. 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 
1988), cert, denied. 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S. Ct. 2873 (1988)); 
accord State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329, 342, 343 (Utah 1991). 
11
 In further support of his claim, defendant also states 
that the trial court struck for cause each of the jurors who 
indicated that he/she or a family member had been charged with an 
offense. Appellant's Br. at 22 n.4. To the extent that claim 
suggests that an affirmative response to the family background 
question was a sufficient basis for removal for cause, and that 
the prosecutor's failure to pursue that determination with 
respect to Ms. Alires is further indication of race motivated 
strike, the claim is doubtful. Four prospective jurors, Ms. 
Laurie Packard, Richard Acey, Victor Coloroso, and George 
Maxwell, answered the family background question affirmatively 
(R. 114). However, the court's removal of those jurors for cause 
was most likely based on other reasons which, unlike the family 
background issue, were the focus of express questioning by the 
court: Ms. Packard indicated that she could not be impartial 
toward the prosecution based on past experience with a 
"dishonest" police officer (R. 351); Mr. Acey was predisposed to 
consider defendant guilty by defendant's merely being in court 
(R. 350, 353-54); Mr. Coloroso indicated a bias in favor of 
police deputies and did not believe that he could give defendant 
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While the prosecutor's failure to question Ms. Alires is 
somewhat compromising, defendant's assertions are, in part, 
purely conjectural and, in sum, fail show that the prosecutor's 
strike was race motivated. The failure to question a prospective 
juror about a lingering doubt undispelled on the record is not 
fatal to a finding that the prosecutor's reasons for striking are 
race-neutral. See State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) (upholding alleged 
race motivated peremptory strike in spite of "suspiciously 
sparse" questioning). While Ms. Alires denied that she or any 
family member had been convicted of an offense, the prosecutor 
was troubled by the fact that he was currently prosecuting 
another defendant of the same name in Salt Lake County for having 
given free eyeglasses to her relatives (R. 368) . In response to 
defendant's retort that he had not struck juror "Smith" and 
others on the panel, the prosecutor noted that he considered 
"Alires" an unusual name, one he had never in fifteen years of 
legal practice encountered before (R. 369-70). Unlike those with 
more common names on the panel, the prosecutor suggested, Ms. 
Alires' name seemed unique and, therefore, memorable (R. 370). 
While he candidly acknowledged that he did not further question 
Ms. Alires (R. 368), the prosecutor might well have thought that 
the benefit of a doubt (R. 354); and Mr. Maxwell knew defense 
counsel socially (R. 336-37). 
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Ms. Alires answered honestly, but might later discover that a 
relative had been charged, resulting in a mistrial. 
Alternatively, the prosecutor might have believed Ms. Alires to 
be withholding an embarrassing fact, one that she would simply 
deny during questioning. See Hicrainbotham. 917 P.2d at 547 
(upholding peremptory strike even though trial court denied 
defense request for follow-up questions about the prospective 
juror's perceived hostility on the assumption that the juror 
would deny any such feelings). In any case, the prosecutor 
evidently felt that he need not take the risk in accepting a 
prospective juror who might be either unwilling or unable to then 
disclose her disability. See Merrill. 928 P.2d at 404 (approving 
the strike of a prospective juror who prosecutor was unwilling to 
risk might be adverse to law enforcement). 
As noted above, the prosecutor's substantive rebuttal to 
defendant's Batson claim, coupled with the trial court's ruling 
on the ultimate issue of discrimination, rendered defendant's 
burden to make a prima facie case moot. However, notwithstanding 
the prosecutor's waiver, the trial court was entitled to consider 
either that Ms. Alires was not a member of .a minority or, even if 
she was, that the prosecutor honestly did not perceive her as 
Hispanic.12 In Harrison, this Court found that the prosecutor's 
12
 In this case the prosecutor did not "merely" provide a 
rebuttal explanation to defendant's Batson challenge, but also 
contested the sufficiency of the prima facie case, asserting that 
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rebuttal explanation, that he liked the Hispanic potential female 
jurors less that the other potential female jurors, was legally 
inadequate. Harrison. 805 P.2d at 778. However, the Court noted 
that it was "not compelled to find clear error in the trial 
court's conclusion that the peremptory challenges were not 
racially motivated," because, although the State had waived the 
question of the prima facie case, it was proper for trial court 
to consider all the facts and circumstances, including the 
absence of a pattern of minority strikes. Id. 
In this case defendant merely asserted that Ms. Alires was 
Hispanic (R. 367). The prosecutor twice denied his recognition 
of Ms. Alires' minority. On appeal defendant suggests that 
because the prosecutor in this case is the same prosecutor in 
Cantu II that agreed to select a potential Hispanic juror from a 
master jury list, the prosecutor must be knowledgeable about 
Hispanic names, and was, therefore, misrepresenting his ignorance 
before the court. Appellant's Br. at 23 n.7. There is nothing 
in the record to support any part of this assertion. Moreover, 
even if the trial court was inclined to accept Ms. Alires as 
Hispanic, its ultimate finding of race-neutrality suggests that 
it at least believed the prosecutor on this point. 
Finally, although unstated by the court, the fact that 
he neither perceived Ms. Alires to be an Hispanic or "Alires" to 
be an Hispanic name (R. 368, 370). See su^ra text accompanying 
note 5. 
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defendant and both Ms. Alires and Ms. Dang are of different races 
undercuts any claim of race discrimination. See Higginbotham. 
917 P.2d at 547 (upholding finding of race-neutral peremptory 
challenge based in part on trial court's finding that because 
defendant was a Caucasian and the stricken juror an Hispanic, 
exclusion for race seemed remote); cf. Hernandez. 500 U.S. at 
369-70, 111 S. Ct. at 1872 (upholding finding of race-neutral 
peremptory strike based, in part, on prosecutor's not knowing 
that prospective jurors were Latino and because same "ethnicity 
of victims and prosecution witnesses tended to undercut any 
motive to exclude Latinos from the jury"); State v. Alvarez. 872 
P.2d 450, 458 (Utah 1994) (same as to identity of juror and 
witness ethnicity). 
Defendant concludes by comparing the prosecutor's 
performance in this case with that of the prosecutor in Cantu II. 
Appellant's Br. at 28. In that case, the prosecutor requested 
the trial court ask only a single question of the challenged 
juror after the prosecutor had already acknowledged that, out of 
animosity toward defense counsel, he would oppose any prospective 
juror defense counsel wanted. Cantu. 778 P.2d at 518-19. The 
supreme court found the peremptory strike discriminatory, based 
on the prosecutorfs "desultory voir dire, uninvolved demeanor, 
and failure to pursue a studied or deliberate course of 
questioning regarding specific bias, together with his stated 
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reasons that the challenge was made in anger." Id. at 519. It 
is clear from the tenor of the opinion that a major reason for 
the supreme court's finding the peremptory strike discriminatory 
was the prosecutor's vindicative approach toward defense 
counsel's desiring a minority juror, and that his "desultory" 
question evidenced that discriminatory motive. Id. 
The prosecutor's conduct and demeanor were demonstrably 
different in this case. Although only a single question was 
asked, unlike the prosecutor in Cantu II. the prosecutor had some 
basis for believing that Ms. Alires might be related to another 
defendant in a pending case. More importantly, the record 
nowhere suggests the prosecutor was angry at either Ms. Alires or 
defense counsel. In fact, the videotape evidences a forthright 
demeanor in the prosecutor's expressed ignorance of Ms. Alires 
ethnicity and his genuine concern about the possibility of her 
being related to a defendant in a pending case (Videotape 
11:13:50-11:14:21 A.M., 11:16:12-36 A.M.) . 
The State acknowledges, as defendant points out, that the 
trial court partly relied on the prosecutor's not striking the 
last prospective minority juror in upholding the peremptory 
strikes, a basis which this Court found unpersuasive in State v. 
Pharris. Appellant's Br. at 27-28. However, this Court's 
reversal of the trial court's ruling in Pharris was based on far 
more egregious oversights than any displayed in this case. In 
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Pharris, the trial court did not even require that the prosecutor 
respond to the defendant's assertion of a prima facie case, and 
when the prosecutor did respond with respect to two of his 
minority challenges, the court foreclosed his having to respond 
to the third. State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 464 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). More importantly, the 
trial court in Pharris found that because the defendant and the 
stricken jurors were of different races, the case was not even 
controlled by Batson. a determination this Court correctly 
rejected. Id. at 465.13 Any oversights by the trial court in 
this case are trivial compared with those in Pharris.14 
In sum, this Court should find that the prosecutor's 
peremptory strikes of Ms. Alires and Ms. Dang were not racially 
motivated and that the trial court's determination of race-
neutrality was not clearly erroneous. 
Ph^yrig correctly cites Ppweysg v, Qfrip, 499 U.S. 400, 
402, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991) for its holding that a criminal 
defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors removed 
by peremptory challenges "whether or not the defendant and the 
excluded juror share the same races." See Pharris. 846 P.2d at 
465. Powers. however, nowhere suggests that a defendant's 
different ethnicity than that of the stricken juror may not 
undercut a claim of race discrimination, as suggested by 
Hernandez. Appellee's Br. at 26. 
14
 Even if this Court should find that the court's findings 
are inadequate, they do not warrant reversal of defendant's 
conviction, as defendant suggests, but rather only reversal of 
the court's ruling with a remand for an evidentiary hearing on 
the race-neutrality of the prosecutor's peremptory strikes. See 
Pharris. 846 P.2d at 465 (remanding for an evidentiary hearing 
upon finding the trial court's determination of race-neutrality 
insufficient or erroneous). 
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POINT XI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO GIVE A CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION LIMITING THE 
JURY'S CONSIDERATION OF REBUTTAL TESTIMONY TO ITS 
IMPEACHMENT VALUE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. 
Defendant argues that on rebuttal the prosecution elicited 
from Deputies Bruno and Cardon that, in offering reasons for his 
behavior, to wit: he was upset about being denied visitation with 
his child, defendant had effectively made admissions of guilt. 
Wishing to avoid a mid-trial suppression hearing on whether 
defendant's admissions were given in violation of Miranda, the 
trial court allowed the admissions in only for impeachment. 
Since the statements were admissible only for impeachment, 
defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing his 
request for an appropriate limiting instruction. Appellant's Br. 
at 8-9, 32. Defendant's argument fails because the trial court 
reasonably exercised its discretion in refusing to give the 
requested instruction under the circumstances of the case and 
because any error was harmless, emphatically demonstrated by 
defendant's failure, either at trial or on appeal, to challenge 
the admissibility of the deputies' testimony in the State's case-
in-chief.15 
15
 The transcript of counsel's argument and the trial 
court's ruling (R. 249-52) is attached at Addendum B. 
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A. The Trial Court Reasonably Exercised its Discretion 
in Denying Defendants Request for a Cautionary 
Ingtr^tJQtt-
1. The Trial Court has Broad Discretion. 
Utah's trial courts have generally been given broad 
discretion in the area of jury instructions. See, e.g., 
State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) (precise working 
and specificity of jury instructions is left to sound discretion 
of trial court); State v, Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Utah 
1986) (refusal to give instruction regarding specific factor 
bearing on credibility was within trial court's discretion). 
Similarly, the question of whether to give a limiting instruction 
is often left up to the complete discretion of the trial judge. 
See, e.g.. State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981) (no 
abuse of trial court's discretion to refuse cautionary 
instruction on potential dangers of substituting taped 
preliminary testimony for live trial witnesses); State v. 
Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court has 
discretion to determine whether curative instruction is required 
in a particular case). 
2. Neither Federal Nor State Cases Cited by Defendant 
Support His Contention that the Trial Court was 
Required to Give a Limiting Instruction. 
Defendant particularly relies on Harris v. New York, wherein 
the United States Supreme Court held that evidence obtained in 
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, while inadmissible against an 
accused in the prosecution's case-in-chief, is admissible for 
impeachment purposes to attack a defendant's credibility. See 
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Harris. 401 U.S. 222, 224-25, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645 (1971); accord 
Michigan v. Harvey. 494 U.S. 344, 351, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1180 
(1990); Oregon v. Hass. 420 U.S. 714, 723, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1221 
(1975); State v. Troyer. 910 P.2d 1182, 1190 (Utah 1995). "If a 
defendant exercises his right to testify on his own behalf, he 
assumes a reciprocal 'obligation to speak truthfully and 
accurately.'" IsL (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225, 91 S. Ct. at 
645). The Supreme Court has "consistently rejected arguments 
that would allow a defendant to 'turn the illegal method by which 
evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own 
advantage, and provide himself with a shield against 
i 
contradiction of his untruths.'" Id. (quotations omitted). 
Defendant correctly notes that the trial court gave the jury 
a limiting instruction in both Harris and Hass.16 See Hass. 420 
U.S. at 717, 95 S. Ct. at 1218; Haixis, 401 U.S. at 223, 91 S. 
Ct. at 644. However, that fact was incidental to the Supreme 
Court's primary focus, namely, determining whether tainted 
evidence was admissible for any purpose, and, based on the 
absence of any reference to the significance of the limiting 
instruction from the Court's analysis, was irrelevant to its 
holdings. See H&&S/ 420 U.S. at 721-24, 95 S. Ct. at 1220-21; 
HaiXia, 401 U.S. at 228-30, 91 S. Ct. at 647-48. Therefore, 
16
 Harvey was a bench trial; therefore, no limiting 
instruction was given. 494 U.S. at 347, 110 S. Ct. at 1178. 
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although limiting instructions were given in both Harris and 
Hass, the Court did not require trial courts to give a cautionary 
instruction limiting the jury's consideration of otherwise 
tainted evidence to its impeachment value only.17 
Defendant similarly suggests that both State v. Gardner, 78 9 
P.2d 273 (Utah 1989) and State v. Ayala. 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 
1988), support his entitlement to a limiting instruction 
following his request. Appellant's Br. at 33-34. However, this 
assumption too is purely speculative. In Ayala. the court 
recognized that statements made in violation of Miranda were 
admissible "to attack the credibility of defendant's trial 
testimony," relying, in part, on Harris. 762 P.2d 1107, 1113 
(Utah App. 1988), cert, denied. 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). The 
Court, however, never reached defendant's claim that he was 
entitled to a limiting instruction because defendant did not 
request it. See j,d. Thus, Ayala is merely suggestive of 
defendant's claim. 
The court's analysis in Gardner similarly provides little 
17
 Defendant also relies on United States v. Martin. 63 F.3d 
1422, 1429 (7th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that a limiting 
instruction should always be given when requested and when 
testimony comes in for impeachment purposes. However, Martin 
only holds that a limiting instruction "should typically be given 
when requested." Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit 
failed to define what would constitute a "typical" case and, by 
using the word "typically," implied trial courts are 
still afforded some measure of discretion to decide if a limiting 
instruction is warranted in a particular case. 
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support for defendant's claim since no limiting instruction was 
requested. £££ 789 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 494 
U.S. 1090 (1990). In Gardner, defendant argued that the trial 
court's failure to instruct the jurors as to the limited use they 
could make of arguably tainted statements was "manifest error," 
requiring reversal of his conviction. Id. The court disagreed, 
finding principally that the evidence was offered on rebuttal 
only for the limited purpose of impeaching defendant's testimony. 
See id. "Thus, when the evidence was received, the jury was 
faced only with deciding whether the rebuttal witness or 
defendant was telling the truth." Id. The court concluded: 
"Given the nature of the testimony, the State's objective in 
offering it, and the manner in which it was received into 
evidence, we cannot say that there was manifest error in the 
failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua 
sponte." Id. Thus, while Gardner too is suggestive, it does not 
plainly support defendant's position. Indeed, considering the 
limited purpose for which the evidence in this case was 
admittedly offered (R. 233, 250-51), Gardner equally supports a 
finding that, at the very least, there was no manifest error in 
the trial court's refusal to give a limiting instruction. 
3. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 105 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence Recognize that Cautionary 
Instructions Often Fail to Limit the Jury's 
Consideration of Some Issues. 
Defendant argues that the trial court was required to 
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provide a limiting instruction to the jury under rule 105, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Rule 105 provides: "When evidence which is 
admissible . . . for one purpose but not admissible . . . for 
another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall 
restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury 
accordingly." Utah R. Evid. 105. In support of the rule's 
directive, defendant cites several cases which he asserts apply a 
mandatory requirement to give a cautionary instruction in 
circumstances comparable to those in this case. Appellant's Br. 
at 34-35. However, neither the rule nor the cited authority are 
applicable to this case. 
First, the advisory committee notes add "the caveat that a 
limiting instruction may be illusory at best, particularly in a 
complex trial or one in which the evidence substantially consists 
of inferences, presumptions or circumstantial evidence;" and 
further, "[t]he matter is addressed to the discretion of the 
court." Utah R. Evid. 105 advisory committee note. 
In this case, although the trial court appears to have 
admitted the deputies' testimony especially for impeachment, the 
trial court never ruled that the deputies had interrogated 
defendant without giving Miranda warnings, and therefore, it is 
not clear that the trial court's admission contemplated that the 
jury could not consider the evidence substantively (R. 250-52) . 
Therefore, the restrictive language of rule 105 was not 
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triggered. 
However, even assuming that the court admitted the deputies' 
testimony for impeachment only, the court recognized the problem 
with giving the jury a limiting instruction: it might cause the 
jury to focus on defendant's inconsistent statements and, instead 
of minimizing prejudice to the defendant, it might actually be 
more prejudicial because the jury might give that evidence even 
greater substantive weight, given their hearing of the same 
evidence during the State's case-in chief- See Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U.S. 368, 389 n.15, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 1787 n.15 (1964) ("The 
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by 
instructions to the jury, . . . all practicing lawyers know to be 
an unmitigated fiction.") (quoting Krulewitch v. United States. 
336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 S. Ct. 716, 723 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted)); Nash v. United States. 54 F.2d 
1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert, denied. 285 U.S. 556, 52 S. Ct. 457 
(1932) (Judge Hand complaining that limiting instructions are 
"recommendations to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is 
beyond, not only their powers, but anybody else's"). 
Second, the trial court recognized that giving a limiting 
instruction was necessarily confusing in the circumstances. 
Defendant's admissions came into evidence in the State's case-in-
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chief without objection as substantive evidence of his guilt.18 
The deputies' impeaching testimony had the same content regarding 
defendant's inculpatory admissions as their testimony on direct 
examination in the State's case-in-chief. The deputies' 
testimony went to the heart of the case, whether defendant was 
the person Deputy Cardon had seen fleeing. Instructing the jury 
at the end of trial19 that it could not consider the deputies' 
rebuttal as substantive evidence, but only for its impeachment 
value, when the jury was also to be allowed to consider precisely 
the same testimony as evidence of defendant's guilt, would have 
been hopelessly confusing and fruitless.20 
18
 As noted above, at no point, either at trial or on 
appeal, has defendant challenged the admissibility of the 
deputies' testimony in the State's case-in-chief. Indeed, 
defendant does not even mention the deputies' direct testimony on 
appeal. 
19
 The trial court also recognized that any value in a 
limiting instruction was greatly compromised by defendant's 
failure to request it at the time the deputies testified to his 
admissions during the State's case-in-chief. See United States 
v. Thirion. 813 F.2d 146, 155-56 (8th Cir. 1987) (a request for a 
limiting instruction should be timely and specific). 
20
 Moreover, attempting to distinguish between substantive 
and impeachment use of the deputies' rebuttal testimony would 
have been illusory in narrow circumstances of this case. 
Defendant denied he was the fleeing motorcyclist. The deputies 
testified on rebuttal that he admitted he was the fleeing 
motorcyclist (R. 234-44) . Given that the testimony of defendant 
and the deputies was in direct conflict, and given that the 
identification of the motorcyclist was central to determining 
culpability, the jury could only have considered the evidence 
substantively by weighing the credibility of the witnesses on 
this crucial point of identification. Indeed, substance and 
credibility are the same in these circumstances. Since the jury 
found defendant guilty, it is plain that they believed the 
deputies' testimony concerning his admissions, a necessary 
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4. Defendant's Reliance on Cases Dealing with the 
Introduction of Other Crimes is Inapposite to this 
Case. 
In support of his argument that a limiting instruction must 
be given when evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, 
defendant cites cases dealing with the introduction of other 
crimes evidence. The State recognizes that evidence of other 
crimes is especially prejudicial because the jury may use it as 
evidence of propensity or may use it retributively to convict, 
entirely apart from the weight of other evidence in the case. 
State v. Newton, 743 P.2d 254, 256 (Wash. 1987). In such cases, 
an instruction to consider the evidence only for precisely what 
it is offered to prove may also be especially appropriate. State 
v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987).21 
However, the deputies' rebuttal testimony in this case 
rebuttal was neither inherently prejudicial nor unrelated to the 
events at issue. Rather, the testimony concerned statements 
innocuous in themselves, but nonetheless incriminating because 
predicate to their verdict. Therefore, an instruction 
distinguishing the two possible uses of the deputies' rebuttal 
testimony would have been meaningless. 
21
 In this same vein defendant also cites in support State 
v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985) (limiting instruction 
should have been given where evidence of juvenile conviction 
admitted, but error not prejudicial); State v. Wellard. 3 Utah 2d 
129, 279 P.2d 914 (Utah 1955) (no error where prior attempt to 
cash check properly admitted to show intent and limiting 
instruction given); and State v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338, 1351-52 
(Utah 1977) (failure to limit jury's consideration of witness's 
inculpatory remark to codefendant only harmless error only). 
Appellant's Br. at 34-35. 
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they bore directly on the principal issue at trial, whether 
defendant was the observed motorcyclist. Thus, defendant was 
"prejudiced," not by unrelated events, but by his own admissions 
which amounted to a confession. Given this circumstance, coupled, 
with the fact that a limiting instruction could only have 
confused the jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to give a limiting instruction. 
c. Even if ths Trial Court's Refusal t<? givs a limiting 
Instruction
 w a g Error, it wag Hgirmlegg Under the 
Circumstances. 
"Harmless errors are 'errors which . . . are sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." State Vt Villareel/ 857 P.2d 949, 957 (Utah App. 
1993), aff'd. 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995) (citing State v. Verde. 
770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989)). "In other words, *for an error 
to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must 
be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" 
Id. (quoting State v. Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987)). 
The burden is on defendant to show that any error was harmful, 
£££ e.g. State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App. 
1996), since any error in this case was not of constitutional 
dimension. £&£ Isaac v. United States. 431 F.2d 11, 15 (9th Cir. 
1970) holding any error in giving a challenged instruction to 
the effect that a witness's prior inconsistent statement might be 
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considered as substantive evidence and not solely for impeachment 
was not subject to the constitutional harmless-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard). 
Even if this Court concludes there was error in the trial 
court's refusal to give a limiting instruction, that error is 
harmless for a variety of reasons. First, as discussed above, 
the impeachment testimony was merely redundant of properly 
admitted, unchallenged testimony given in the State's case-in-
chief. £££ United States v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191, 193 (8th cir. 
1977) (per curiam) (admission of unrecorded prior inconsistent 
statement, even if improperly admitted, was not prejudicial where 
it was cumulative of another properly admitted prior inconsistent 
statement). Thus, a limiting instruction to consider the 
rebuttal only for impeachment purposes would not have affected 
the jury's consideration of the deputies' direct testimony given 
to directly prove defendant's guilt. Rather, such an instruction 
would only have confused the jury. 
Second, there was substantial evidence of defendant's guilt. 
See Pierre. 572 P.2d at 1352 (error in failing to give requested 
limiting instruction not prejudicial where "there was such a 
plethora of direct and circumstantial evidence probative of 
defendant's guilt"). Deputy Cardon clearly and unhesitatingly 
identified defendant as the man on the motorcycle and defendant 
met the suspect's physical and sartorial description (R. 147, 
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151, 185, 143-44, 157) .22 In addition, defendant was ultimately 
discovered very close to the same spot where Deputy Cardon had 
first seen him (R. 154, 184). Deputy Cardon was also ua hundred 
percent sure" that defendant's motorcycle was the same one she 
had chased earlier (R. 156), the bike matched her initial 
description (R. 155), and Deputy Bruno noted it had a hot engine, 
despite the fact that defendant said he had been home all night 
and that no one else had used the motorcycle (R. 194-96, 200) .23 
Finally, Deputy Cardon testified, during the State's case-in-
22
 Defendant argues that xx[t]he critical issue at trial was 
the reliability of Cardon's eye witness identification of the 
driver" of the motorcycle and claims that he "was prejudiced by 
the trial court's refusal to properly instruct the jury 
[concerning the rebuttal evidence] because the trial court's 
ruling allowed the jury to avoid having to weigh the eye witness 
identification evidence against the State's burden of proving its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt." Appellant's Br. at 37. 
Although defendant emphasizes that Deputy Cardon only caught 
brief glimpses of defendant's face, Deputy Cardon provided strong 
testimony positively identifying defendant as the suspect. She 
stated that she got a good look at defendant several times (R. 
142, 143, 147), and that there was no question in her mind that 
defendant was the person she had been chasing (R. 157, 185). 
Given this compelling testimony, the jury could not have avoided 
weighing Deputy Cardon's identification. Indeed, the jury 
probably placed great weight on this evidence in favor of the 
State. "This Court is obliged to accept that version of the 
facts which the jury apparently believed and which supports the 
verdict." State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052, 1056 (Utah 1985). More 
importantly, the jury specifically received a cautionary 
instruction on eye-witness identification and the need to 
scrutinize such testimony (R. 62, Jury Instruction No. 17). 
Therefore, contrary to what defendant suggests, the jury was not 
only sure to weigh Deputy Cardon's identification of defendant as 
the perpetrator but was legally bound to weigh and evaluate it as 
well. 
23
 Defendant later said that he had driven his car instead 
of his motorcycle. However, Deputy Bruno found that the car's 
engine was extremely cold (R. 197-98). 
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chief, that on the way to jail defendant said he was sorry for 
causing problems and claimed he led deputies on a chase because 
his wife in Toronto would not let him see his children (R. 158). 
There was thus a "plethora" of evidence supporting defendant's 
conviction. 
Third, the clear purpose of recalling Deputies Bruno and 
Cardon as rebuttal witnesses was to impeach24 defendant's 
immediately-preceding testimony that he was falsely identified 
(R. 222) and that he never made remarks acknowledging that he 
fled from Deputy Cardon (R. 224). Gardner. 789 P.2d at 282 
(holding no manifest error in court's refusal to give limiting 
instruction where rebuttal testimony plainly offered only for 
limited purpose of impeachment).25 When Deputy Bruno was 
recalled, defense counsel objected that the admissions had 
already been testified to in the State's case-in-chief (R. 235). 
The court overruled the objection, and stated, in the presence of 
the jury: "Mr. Bowman said that he didn't tell the deputies that, 
and Mr. Walsh (the prosecutor) is certainly entitled to use this 
24
 Defendant argues that even though the deputies' rebuttal 
testimony was offered only for impeachment, the prosecutor 
improperly argued the evidence substantively in closing. 
Appellant's Br. at 37 n.15. The argument fails to note that 
precisely the same evidence was admitted without objection in the 
State's case-in-chief (R. 158, 209-10), making the prosecutor's 
limited remarks (R. 283) entirely appropriate. 
25
 See Verde. 770 P. 2d at 121-22 (equating "manifest 
injustice" with "plain error" in most circumstances). 
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to contradict that" (R. 235) . Based on these statements made by 
defense counsel and the court, the reappearance of Deputies Bruno 
and Cardon, the timing of the deputies' reappearance immediately 
following defendant's testimony, and the pointed questions posed 
to Deputies Bruno and Cardon about "what Mr. Bowman said about 
why he had run from the police," (R. 235, 241), it would have 
been obvious to the jury that the clear purpose of recalling 
Deputies Bruno and Cardon on rebuttal was to impeach defendant's 
testimony. 
In sum, because (1) the limiting instruction requested by 
defendant would have been confusing and even meaningless, (2) 
there was substantial independent evidence of guilt, and (3) 
rebuttal testimony was clearly limited only to impeachment, any 
error in refusing to give the jury a limiting instruction was 
harmless. 
PQXNT III 
DEPENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY 
COMMENTED ON HIS ABILITY TO SUBPOENA A WITNESS WAS NOT 
PRESERVED, LACKS MERIT, AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OP THE 
CASE CONSTITUTES INVITED ERROR. ANY ERROR WAS AT MOST 
HARMLESS. 
A. Defendant is Precluded from Raising this Issue on 
Appeal Because he Failed to Specifically State 
the Grounds for his Objection Purina the State's 
ClQgittg Argwneflt-
A timely and specific objection must be made in order to 
preserve an issue for appeal. See Utah R. Evid 103(a) . "Where 
there [is] no clear or specific objection . . . and the specific 
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ground for objection [is] not clear from the context of the 
question or the testimony, the theory cannot be raised on 
appeal." State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986). 
The purpose of the waiver rule is to put the court on notice of 
the asserted error so that it can timely correct it, if need be. 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1993). 
In closing, defendant argued the inadequacy of the 
identification, inferring that the State did not call Kevin 
Mitchell to testify because he would not support Deputy Cardon's 
identification of defendant (R. 272). In rebuttal, the 
prosecutor explained the limited purpose of Mitchell's 
information, i.e., to explain the deputies' actions in going to 
defendant's and his parents' residences, and that if defendant 
thought he was so important a witness, defendant had every 
opportunity to bring him in (R. 280-81).26 At that point 
defendant objected, explaining that he would have called Mitchell 
to testify, but did not because he assumed the witness would be 
present.27 
26
 The transcript of defendant's closing (R. 272-74) and the 
prosecutor's rebuttal (R. 280-82) is attached at Addendum C. 
27
 Defense counsel's complete objection was as follows: 
"Objection to that, Judge. Of course, 
[Mitchell's] listed as a prosecution witness on the 
police reports, and if I'd have known he wasn't going 
to be here, I would have done that, 
but --" 
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That objection fails to inform the court that defendant was 
challenging the prosecutor's response on the ground that the 
prosecutor improperly invoked the "missing witness inference"28 
or that the comment shifted the burden to defendant to prove his 
innocence, errors asserted for the first time on appeal. 
When the prosecutor, with the court's approval reiterated 
his earlier remarks, adding that defendant had the opportunity to 
subpoena Mitchell to expose the putative flaw in the State's 
case, defendant failed to object (R. 281-82). Given the complete 
lack of specificity in defendant's objection, this Court should 
refuse to consider the merits of defendant's claim. However, 
even if defendant's claim was preserved, it lacks merit. 
B. Defendant Fails to Show that the Prosecutor's Comment 
Improperly Shifted to Him the Burden to Prove His 
Innocence. 
uThe test for determining whether a prosecutor's statements 
at trial constitute error is whether the remarks 'called to the 
jurors1 attention matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in reaching a verdict.'" State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v, gmmett, 839 P.2d 
781, 785 (Utah 1992)). 
Defendant's principal argument is that the prosecutor 
(R. 281). 
28
 £&£ State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Utah 1985) (the 
missing witness inference permits the jury to infer that the 
testimony of an uncalled witness would have been unfavorable). 
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improperly shifted to him the burden to prove his innocence when 
he stated that defendant could have subpoenaed Mitchell. 
Appellant's Br. at 38-40.29 Defendant relies primarily on 
Whitney v. State. 915 P.2d 881 (Nev. 1996), which states that "it 
is generally improper for a prosecutor to comment on the 
defense's failure to . . . call witnesses as such comment 
impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to the defense." Id. at 
883 (holding that prosecutor's repeated referral to the defense's 
failure to produce a putatively significant witness prejudicial 
error. Id. at 882-83. However, Nevada's ready condemnation of 
prosecutorial use of the missing witness inference, without 
consideration of the prerequisites for invoking the inference, is 
out of step with Utah law. See State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 
50 (Utah 1989) (finding prosecutor's reference to the defendant's 
failure to call a witness error because the witness was equally 
available to both parties, but harmless because the witness was 
not essential). 
Dispositive of defendant's claim is State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 
1052 (Utah 1985), wherein the defendant suggested that not he, 
but rather witnesses not called to testify by the State had 
29
 Defendant's argument is initially premised on the 
"missing witness inference," improperly invoked when the 
prosecutor suggested that if defendant thought Mitchell was such 
an important witness, defendant could have subpoenaed him (R. 
281-82). The context of the claim plainly shows that any error 
on this subsidiary point was invited, as discussed below. 
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committed the offense. Id. at 1057. The trial judge interrupted 
the defense counsel and instructed the jury that "the State had 
no burden as relates to [those witnesses] in this case and the 
defendant had all of the rights of the State to bring them in," 
and told the jury to disregard what defense counsel had said. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court rejected Smith's claim, stating "the 
judge's comment in no way implied that defendant had an 
affirmative duty to call witnesses or shifted the burden of 
production." Id. ("The judgefs comment at most simply indicated 
that defendant could have called [the missing witnesses] had he 
believed that their testimonies were important, essential, or 
exculpatory."). Because the prosecutor's comment in this case 
states no more than the trial judge's in Smith, this Court should 
find defendant's claim without merit.30 
30
 Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's comment was an 
improper use of the "missing witness inference." Appellant's Br. 
at 39-40. However, the prosecutor's comment was merely made in 
response to defendant's improper invocation of that inference. 
In Smith, the court discussed the prerequisites for invoking 
the "missing witness inference," to wit: "the defendant must 
establish that the missing witness was "peculiarly within the 
adversary's power to produce by showing either that the witness 
is physically available only to the opponent, or that the witness 
has the type of relationship with the opposing party that 
pragmatically renders his testimony unavailable to the opposing 
party." Id. 706 P.2d at 1057-58 (citation omitted) (defense 
counsel's comment about the state's failure to call the missing 
witnesses "was properly prohibited because "defendant elicited no 
shred of evidence to prove that [the witnesses'] testimony was 
unavailable to defendant and did not demonstrate that the 
witnesses "were peculiarly within the power of the state to 
produce"). Accord Thompson. 776 P.2d at 50 (finding prosecutor's 
invocation of the missing witness inference improper, though 
harmless, where the missing witness was "equally accessible to 
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C. Defendants Argument Constitutes Invited Error, 
In any event, even if the State's comment on defendant's 
ability to call Mitchell as a witness was arguably improper, this 
Court should reject defendant's argument because he invited any 
error. 
"The doctrine of invited error 'prohibits a party from 
setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on 
appeal.'" State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quoting State v. Henderson. 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); 
accord State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). The 
purpose of this rule is to discourage a defendant in a criminal 
case from inviting prejudicial error and then implanting it in 
the record "as a form of appellate insurance against an adverse 
sentence." State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989). 
In State v, Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), during 
both parties"). 
In this case defendant has made no attempt to demonstrate, 
either at trial or on appeal, that Mitchell was peculiarly within 
the power of the State to produce as a witness or that his 
testimony was otherwise "unavailable." In fact, defense counsel 
admitted that, had he known the State was not going to call 
Mitchell as a witness, he would have called Mitchell himself (R. 
2 81). Mitchell was thus equally accessible to both parties and 
defendant had all of the rights and powers of the State to 
subpoena him. In addition, defendant did not request a jury 
instruction on the missing witness inference, see Smith. 706 P.2d 
at 1057, obtain an advance ruling from the trial court before 
arguing to the jury for a missing witness inference, see 
Thompson. 776 P.2d at 50, and in fact waited until after the jury 
had been instructed and the prosecutor had argued the case to 
raise the absence of Mitchell. See Smith. 706 P.2d at 1058. 
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closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that the defendant 
would probably be a 67-year-old man when he got out of prison 
following a life sentence, "broken and old and incapable of 
causing damage to anyone." 750 P.2d at 559-60. In response, the 
prosecutor questioned whether defendant would be a better person 
fifteen years hence when he got out of prison given the lack of 
remorse he had shown during the trial. Id. at 560. Defendant 
then contended on appeal that the prosecutor's comments "were 
misleading and had the potential of improperly influencing its 
decision on the death penalty." Id. 
In rejecting this argument, the Utah Supreme Court found it 
significant that "it was defense counsel who first commented that 
in Utah, parole is a possibility under a life sentence." Id. 
The court held that while the prosecutor's remarks "were arguably 
improper and prejudicial . . . , his comments, when placed within 
the context of his and defense counsel's entire arguments, fall 
within the ambit of permitted conduct." Id. The court concluded 
that "[i]nasmuch as defense counsel himself chose to initiate and 
argue [comments about the consequences of sentencing] and failed 
to object to the prosecutor's response to the same, he should be 
deemed to have invited the error (if there was any) and waived 
any objection." Id. 
In this case, defense counsel's statements about the 
prosecution's failure to call Mitchell as a witness similarly 
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"opened the door to the prosecutor's remarks," Tillman. 750 P.2d 
at 560. The prosecutor, by referencing defendant's equal ability 
and opportunity to call Mitchell as a witness, was simply 
attempting to respond to and rebut defense counsel's previous 
statements. When placed within the context of the State's and 
defense counsel's entire arguments, the prosecutor's remarks 
"fall within the ambit of permitted conduct." In triggering 
rebuttal by the prosecutor, defense counsel invited any error.31 
Given the context of the prosecutor's response, this Court should 
31
 Defense counsel also failed to make a specific objection 
to the prosecutor's remarks and/or move for a mistrial on the 
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 
561 (noting defense counsel failed to either object to the 
prosecutor's remarks or to move for a mistrial on the basis of 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
Even if the prosecutor's statement was improper, it was not 
harmful. See Taylor. 884 P.2d at 1296 ("Only if the improper 
statements are deemed to be harmful will they require reversal.") 
(citing Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785); Tillman. 750 P.2d at 561 (no 
prejudice where prosecutor's rebuttal in closing merely a 
response issue raised by defense counsel and jury admonished to 
consider only evidence introduced at trial); see also State v. 
Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1989) (if the jury was inclined 
to be influenced by the State's improper remarks, "the jury 
instructions that were given cured any potential error"). 
Similarly, the prosecution's rebuttal was not prejudicial 
since defense counsel had already brought up Mitchell's absence 
and, in fact, had admitted that he would have called Mitchell if 
he had known the prosecution would not. Moreover, as in Tillman 
and Thompson, the jury had been admonished not to consider either 
party's closing arguments as evidence and had been instructed, 
immediately prior to closing arguments, that the State bore the 
burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that defendant had no burden whatsoever to put on evidence or 
call witnesses in his defense (R. 44-49, 59, 61, 62). Finally, 
given the substantial evidence supporting a conviction, see Point 
11(C) above, it is not reasonable to expect that the jury would 
have reached a different verdict if the State's remarks had been 
excluded by the trial court. 
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decline to review defendant's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
reqUests that defendant's convictionsbe affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /f day of April, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General Attorney General ^  >^ 
^KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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WHAT CRIME? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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YEAR? WHERE! 
HAVE YOU / FAMILY MEMBER BEEN CHARGED WITH AN OFFENSE? YES (NO/ 
IF SO, WHAT? YEAR? WHERE? 
IF SO, WHAT? YEAR? WHERE? 
IS THERE A REASON YOU WOULD BE UNABLE TO SERVE ON A JURY TODAY? 
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ADDENDUM B 
! I MR. WALSH: May the other deputies be 
2 excused, Judge? 
3 THE COURT: Anything—that's right. 
4 We'll excuse the witnesses. 
5 Anything else that needs to be placed on the 
6 record? 
7 MR. YOONGBERG: Judge, I — I probably 
8 should just put this on the record, before you leave, Dave. 
9 MR. WALSH: Lenny, you can leave if you 
10 want. Yes. 
11 MR. TOUNGBERG: I did get a copy of the 
12 follow-up report today from the officer. That's the report 
13 in which this apparent questioning is mentioned, that the 
14 prosecutor got evidence of. 
15 It appears that the questioning was done without 
16 Miranda rights, and so Z would move that there be a--an 
17 instruction given to the jury that they should not consider 
18 that evidence. And I apologise for not bringing this up, 
19 you know, six months ago; but as I said, this is the first 
20 day we've seen this officer's report. 
21 It appears to be a violation of h i s — o f his 
22 Constitutional rights. Judge, in that he was not given his 
23 Miranda rights prior to the questioning and so I'd ask for a 
24 curative instruction. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Walsh? 
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1 MR. WALSH: Judge, most of what is 
2 contained in that report, except what Deputy Bruno testified 
3 to, did not come out until rebuttal evidence, when the 
4 officer, Officer Bruno testi—or I mean Deputy Cardon; but 
5 the portion about the wife and the kids being in Canada, 
6 that was initially brought up when he testified, and then in 
7 response to that, I questioned him about it and then asked 
8 the officers to come in and impeach him. And for purposes 
9 of impeachment, whether there's Miranda or not, those 
10 statements are admissible. 
11 Furthermore, Judge, I don't think there's—as the-
12 -as everybody's testified, this was not in response to any 
13 interrogation. Mr. Bowman was just ranting and raving and 
14 repeating himself over and over and over again. 
15 THE COURT: Clearly, what Officer Cardon 
16 testified to was rambling; but Officer Bruno seemed to 
17 indicate that this may-very well may have been as a result 
18 of questioning after the arrest. 
19 MR. WALSH: And that's what I say. It's 
20 significant, Judge, that after he's testified, if there is 
2i no Miranda, if there—even assume there is no Miranda, and a 
22 violation of the Miranda rights, the Court has said that 
23 doesn't give him the right to take the stand and lie, and so 
if there—if it's used for impeachment, and that's why I 
I left it until the end, if it's used for impeachment, then 
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1 it's appropriate, whether there's Miranda or not. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 I MR. YOUNGBERG: And just for the record, 
4 Judge, the officer's report does state, and I quote, "Mr. 
5 Bowman was asked why he ran. Mr. Bowman said that his wife 
6 won't let him see his kids, that she lives in Toronto." 
7 Once again, Mr. Bowman was asked why he ran, and 
8 he stated that he was just acting out a life and that he was 
9 I a wild man. 
10 So, it does appear to be an interrogation. If 
11 that's what the prosecutor is offering it for, then we need 
12 an instruction in that—for that, saying that it's 
13 impeachment evidence only and it's not substantive evidence, 
14 MR. WALSH: Hell, and I beg to differ, 
15 Judge. If it's impeachment evidence, it can be--it's 
16 substantive evidence, and therefore, it comes in as 
17 substantive evidence of what he said at that time. You 
18 know, and that's why X left it to the end, I didn't bring it 
19 out on direct examination, the story about the kids and 
20 whatever, in Canada. 
21 I So, as I say, I mean, once he's taken the stand, 
22 whether there's a violation or not, he's not entitled to 
23 take the stand and lie. And so that's why the Supreme Court 
24 has held that if there's a violation of Miranda, if he 
25 testifies, then all—then he's fair game as to what he said. 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Youngberg, I understand 
2 the point that you're making. I'm not going to give the 
3 curative instruction. Let me state for the record a couple 
4 of reasons why. 
5 One, Z think Mr. Walsh is correct that the law 
6 makes that admissible; but two, I think that would draw the 
7 attention of the jury to the question, when I think that the 
8 case that the two of you have laid out for the jury is 
9 really a question of whether the officer did see the person 
10 or not. 
11 And it's for those two reasons; first, I don't 
12 believe it's critical that they be instructed on that, and 
13 second, that it was admissible as it was presented. 
14 Okay. Anything else that needs to be placed on 
15 the record? 
16 MR. YOUNGBERG: No, Judge. 
17 MR. WALSH: No, sir. 
18 THE COURT: Are you ready to argue about 
19 it, gentlemen, or do you need a moment? 
20 I MR. YOUNGBERG: Yeah. 
21 I MR. WALSH: Don't need any time, Judge. 
22 I THE COURT: Okay. Let's bring them back 
23 then. 
24 I Gene, I'd ask you to hand out the jury 
25 instructions, if you would, please, sir. 
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And I hope you didn't take offense at the fact that I 
thought it was funny that she kept saying she was 
absolutely, positively sure, for sure, without any possible. 
blah-blah-blah, and what they're trying to say is, she's 
sure beyond a reasonable doubt, so you should be. I mear.. 
let's just say what they're saying here. That's not the 
case. And as they say in Hamlet, the lady doth pretest too 
much, methinks. 
The fact that they're trying to convince you so 
hard makes me think that somewhere down inside there, that 
they aren't--that there is a question, because they see that 
this is not the best identification, so they're making a 
concerted effort to say, absolutely, positively, for sure, 
for sure, for sure. 
Hell, here's the problem with that. Kevin 
Mitchell is the problem with that. Kevin Mitchell is the 
reason why you should acquit this man today because he's the 
one that identified Scott Bowman. 
Now, the Judge has instructed you before this that 
Kevin Mitchell's identification cannot be used for--to show 
that he's guilty of the crime. All it's supposed to be used 
for is to explain the officers' actions after that time. 
That's pretty hard for you to do, and I understand. 
Kevin Mitchell comes up to the police officer 
after they've lost the motorcyclist. Even Deputy Cardon 
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1 said it was odd, and I think that's a good way to put it, it 
2 was odd. Kevin Mitchell, also known as Kelly, has a 
3 problem, there's bad blood between him and Mr. Bowman, for 
4 the reasons Mr. Bowman told you. 
5 Kevin Mitchell should be here today to testify. 
6 He is supposedly, according to him, an eyewitness to this 
7 crime. There--rather than—than Deputy Cardon's few seconds 
8 of observation, the State should have produced Kevin 
9 Mitchell, the supposed witness, recall the State having the 
10 burden to prove the case. Kevin Mitchell should be here 
11 testifying. He's a witness. 
12 Where was he standing? What is his reasons for 
13 lying? What does he look like? What kind of a motorcycle 
14 does he drive? The fact that h e ' s — h e ' s trying to be out to 
15 get Scott and is he mistaken, for crying out loud? Did he 
16 see the motorcycle shoot by him at 90 miles an hour and say, 
17 there's that son-of-a-gun Scott Bowman that I hate? I mean, 
18 we can't tell that, and that's why the Judge has instructed 
19 you not to use his identification evidence to convict, only 
20 to explain the officers' movements. 
2i But I would**X would argue to you that the State 
22 has a responsibility to present these evidence—this 
23 evidence and that it was not presented and that that alone 
24 I is enough to show a reasonable doubt in this case, because 
25 it's evidence that we need to make t h e — a decision on all 
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1 the facts, not just the facts that the prosecution wants you 
2 to hear. 
3 Interesting to consider the witness9 demeanor, 
4 too. If you recall, everybody on the stand has an interest 
5 in the case and I think it's kind o f — I would argue it's 
6 ludicrous to say that an officer doesn't care whether or not 
7 that—they win a case or not, that's why they sit there all 
8 day, that's why they put them on the stand, like they're 
9 kinds like the plaintiff and he's kinda like the defendant. 
10 Of course they have a motive, not necessarily to 
11 lie, but a motive to be successful, to see that their 
12 arrests are--are upheld and that sort of thing, which is one 
13 reason we don't allow the police to decide who's guilty of a 
14 crime, that's why we have juries, because—because they are 
15 not unbiased observers. If they were, we would just allow 
16 them to decide this case; right? That's why you're here in 
17 this jury box and the rest of us are outside of it. 
18 Mow, Deputy Cardon was given information by this 
19 absent witness, Kevin Mitchell. She was given a name and we 
20 don't know what all, description. 
21 I It's unclear from the evidence today when Bruno 
22 1 received his information, if that was part of the Mitchell 
23 information, or if it was strictly Deputy Cardon's 
24 I observations; it's just not clears 
25 What I would—what happened in this case is that 
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Prosecutor's Rebuttal in Closing 
you my boss' number if you want and you can complain about 
me, but—but please, look at the case without me there if 
there's something that I've done that's bothered you. 
Second of all, take the time necessary to go 
through this--this case, this is a serious enough case, 
both the State and—and Mr. Bowman have the right to have 
you take this seriously and to—and to spend the time 
necessary to deliberate, although as X said before, it is a 
simple case in a lot of ways. 
I hate to sit down here because I know I'm going 
to forget—I'm going to remember that I didn't say 
something, but at this point, the case is yours, you hold 
this man's life in your hand, and I would ask—would pray 
that you look at the evidence and that you find him not 
guilty of this charge. 
Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Mr. Walsh, you have about 
ten minutes left on your time. 
MR. WAL8H: Thanks, Judge. 
I have an opportunity to respond to some of those 
items that Mr. Toungberg raised. 
He mentions to you, why isn't Kevin Mitchell here, 
why didn't the State produce him? Hell, let me tell you 
what Mr. Mitchell--you've seen what he provides, he just 
told us where—or at least the officers, where—who this 
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1 person was and where that person lived. That's all he's 
2 necessary for us to have, and we could have all other—three 
3 other officers and everybody else that was involved, we 
4 could have brought in the person that was stopped down 
5 farther by-through Granite, the other person on the 
6 motorcycle; but that's not essential for our case. 
7 And so if Mr. Bowman--or if Mr. Youngberg thinks 
8 he's such an important witness, although he has no 
9 responsibility to produce any evidence, he has every 
10 opportunity to bring him in and let you hear from him. So, 
11 if he wanted you to hear from him, he has that opportunity--
12 MR. YOUNGBERG: Objection to that, 
13 Judge. Of course, he's listed as a prosecution witness on 
14 the police reports, and if I'd have known he wasn't going to 
15 be here, I would have done that, b u t — 
1G MR. WALSH: Well, I'll object to him 
17 insinuating that Z knew he wasn't going to be here. 
18 THE COURT: Well, I don't think that's 
19 what he did. He aimply-Counsel indicated that if you 
20 wished him to testify, you could have brought him; so, I'll 
21 overrule the objection. 
22 I MR. WALSH: Thank you, Judge. 
23 So, i f — i f that's such a big deal to Mr. 
24 Youngberg, he has every opportunity to bring in everybody he 
25 wants, he has the subpoena power of the Court and so he 
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1 wants you to think, boy, that's a big flaw in the State's 
2 case. That's no flaw in the State's case, all the evidence 
3 and all the information that he provided, you heard from 
4 the--from Deputy Cardon. 
5 I You know, there's another interesting piece of 
6 evidence--two other interesting pieces of evidence that you 
7 should consider in deciding yes, that this was Mr. Bowman. 
8 Where did this person go? When he was fleeing the police 
9 officer, where did he go? 
10 He went, you recall Officer Cardon that from there 
11 to the back wall, he was that close to being home. He was 
12 that close. He was within, what, 40 to 60 feet, somewhere 
13 in that vicinity. You'll recall that the apartment was this 
14 close to the business where Mr. Bowman went behind. So he 
15 went home. 
16 And that's what you would expect somebody who's 
17 almost home at night, hefs--whatever he's doing, but he's 
18 almost home, you would expect that to happen. Why didn't he 
19 stay? Because the officer was right there. 
20 And so when the officers, with their lights and 
21 sirens show up, hey, he's got--he can't go home immediately 
22 and so he takes off and goes back down the very same path 
23 that he had come from. So, that's an interesting piece of 
24 evidence which indicates that whoever it was who was fleeing 
25 knew right where he was, knew that there was a little 
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